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Introducing Contemporaneous Open-Outcry and 
E-Trading at the Chicago Board of Trade 
 
Carlos A. Ulibarri∗  
 
Abstract 
 
This study uses a vector error correction (VEC) model to examine price-volume relation- 
ships between open outcry and e-trading at the Chicago Board of Trade. We test whether 
equilibrium price corrections on one system are independent of the other, and whether this price 
behavior is more sensitive to changes in screen-based volume as opposed to open outcry volume. 
Error correction terms capture an asymmetric price adjustment process led by open outcry 
trading. Open outcry volume (market depth) also results in price discovery by dampening price 
volatility on both markets. These aspects of market microstructure are relevant in identifying 
how newly introduced e-trading systems operate in relation to established open outcry systems, 
and how e-trading systems may affect the economic performance of futures exchanges generally.   
Keywords: Market liquidity; Bid-ask spreads; Open outcry; Screen-based trading 
 
1. Introduction  
Stigler [15] reminds us that competition motivates market participants to 
provide goods and services skillfully and economically, and at times experi- 
ment with new ways of doing business. This behavior is exemplified by The 
Chicago Board of Trade’s (CBOT) advancement of e-trading platforms–in- 
novations which gained early acceptance in Europe and have since trans- 
formed the mechanics of futures trading. Some exchanges have used e-
trading systems to extend trading hours; examples include the Chicago 
Board of Trade’s Project A® and a/c/e™ electronic trading systems 
(Ulibarri [16]), the New York Mercantile Exchange’s ACCESS® system 
(Ulibarri [17]), and the Automated Pit Trading system once used at the 
London International Fin- ancial Futures Exchange (LIFFE).  In other 
applications futures exchanges adopted e-trading systems exclusively; 
examples include EUREX, the elec- tronic German-Swiss exchange which 
formed with the merger between the Deutch Terminbose (DTB) and the 
Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange (SOFFEX); and the newly 
formed Euronext.liffe (2001), which merged the derivatives markets of 
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Amsterdam, Brussels, LIFFE, Lisbon and Paris under a single electronic 
trading platform, LIFFE CONNECT®. 
Clearly the development of e-trading at European exchanges changed 
the organization of the global futures industry. As a leading player in the in- 
dustry, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was the first US derivatives 
exchange to adopt e-trading when it launched its Project A platform in 1994.  
Over the next four years Project A served as an after-hours market without 
much growth in contract volume. On the contrary, the growth of e-trading 
volume at European exchanges more than doubled1. Thus to position itself 
in the emerging technological revolution CBOT launched its “side-by-side” 
trading platform in September 1998 by extending Project A hours to run 
con- currently with the boisterous open outcry auction. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the early performance of 
CBOT’s side-by-side markets at promoting “price discovery”--the process 
by which markets attempt to find equilibrium prices, thereby enabling 
market makers to exchange contracts more economically (Schreiber and 
Schwartz, [12]). A number of papers have considered price discovery across 
electronic and open outcry futures markets, particularly between the German 
Bund futures contract which was traded electronically at the DTB and 
through open outcry at LIFFE2.  
For example, Shyy and Lee [13] present evidence that the DTB’s auto- 
mated price movements Granger cause LIFFE’s open outcry price move- 
ments. This finding is surprising given that the average daily trading volume 
on LIFFE was about two or three times that of DTB, or 91,674 contracts 
compared to 39,300 contracts.3 On the contrary, Kofman and Moser [8] 
report bi-directional causality between the two Bund markets and suggest 
there may be more information-based trading on the DTB. Pirrong [10] 
                                                          
1 Early studies by Baptiste et al. [1], Sarkar and Tozzi [14], and Price Waterhouse [11] found 
global use of electronic trading systems (from eight systems in 1990 to about forty in 1997, 
with electronic trading volume increasing from 7 percent in 1989 to 18 percent in 1996). 
2 Footnote 7 briefly describes organizational changes and restructuring at LIFFE pursuant to the 
evolution of e-trading at European exchanges. 
3 Shyy and Lee [13] use an error correction model to test Granger causality, finding that price 
movements on the DTB caused price movements in LIFFE (the methodology is discussed 
below in section 3). Interestingly, the t-values for lagging variables suggest the price trans- 
mission process was very fast, with only the one-minute lag variable for DTB having signi- 
icant impact on LIFFE price movements. The authors are surprised by the finding of a 
unidirectional lead from the DTB to LIFFE given LIFFE exhibited a significantly larger 
trading volume in Bund futures than the DTB. 
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meanwhile, presents evidence that market liquidity and depth were greater 
on the DTB’s e-trading system than LIFFE’s open outcry market. In 
retrospect, the evidence presented by both Pirrong and Shyy & Lee 
corresponds with LIFFE’s decision to switch from open outcry to its current 
e-trading plat- form, LIFFE CONNECT®.   
Meanwhile, little is known about the relationship between e-trading and 
open-outcry at US derivatives exchanges; in particular, the process of price 
discovery and the attending role of market depth. The present study focuses 
on price discovery at the CBOT over a sampling period dominated by open 
outcry trading (1998-1999). Assuming open outcry auctions play a leader- 
ship role in determining price equilibrium, the study tests for a one-way 
causal relationship between sides. The importance of market depth (trading 
volume) in determining price adjustment behavior is also examined, with 
specific focus on how volume surprises on one side of the platform impact 
the other. These aspects of market microstructure are of interest to financial 
economists in terms of understanding how the emergence of e-trading im- 
pacts the simultaneous operation of open outcry auctions, and how this inter- 
action conditions the economic performance of futures exchanges generally. 
This study provides three extensions over previous work in comparing 
electronic and open outcry markets. First, this research deviates from the 
European-based studies by examining the price-effects from e-trading 
during the first year of side-by-side operations. Secondly, by focusing on the 
opera- tion of the CBOT side-by-side trading platform, this study tests price-
volume relationships between systems operating contemporaneously at a 
common exchange. Thirdly, a vector error correction (VEC) framework is 
used to ex- amine the economic effects of market depth in explaining price-
volume rela- tionships across trading systems. This econometric framework 
yields testable implications concerning the impacts of market depth on price 
volatility, and the leadership role of open outcry auctions during the early 
stages of e-trading.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
some of the institutional background behind the development of e-trading 
networks at the CBOT. Section 3 describes a study data set for examining 
causal relationships in the price discovery process and the attending role of 
market depth. Section 4 applies a VEC framework in testing price-volume 
behavior in the side-by-side market platform, followed by a summary of 
findings and concluding remarks. 
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2. CBOT E-Trading Platforms  
In 1994, the CBOT introduced its first e-trading platform, Project A.  
This trading system used an electronic order-entry and order-matching sy- 
stem for exchanging futures contracts and options on futures contracts. As 
on other e-trading platforms, trade execution on Project A required three 
prin- cipal components: i) remote computer terminals from where customer 
orders are submitted and trade confirmations are received; ii) a centralized 
host computer which processed/executed trades; and iii) a network linking 
the various terminals to the host computer and the host computer to the 
clear- inghouse4. Incoming orders on Project A get routed and processed 
electroni- cally by the host computer using a trade execution algorithm 
subject to rules establishing their priority. For example, the Project A 
algorithm matched bids with offers according to priority rules over price and 
time of entry: or- ders that “made the market” (beating the best bid or ask 
prices) were given priority over orders that were “at the market” or within 
one tick of the market.   
Beginning September 1998, the CBOT began operating Project A con- 
currently alongside its open outcry auction of T-bond futures. Each market 
was treated as a separate exchange: orders entered into on Project A could 
not be filled in the open outcry auction, and vice-versa. However, transac- 
tions on either market could offset each other at the end of the trading day 
through the clearing function, then provided by the Board of Trade Clearing 
Corporation. Despite Project A’s potential to enhance technical efficiencies 
and process orders at a lower cost, it remained an auxiliary market relative to 
the much deeper open outcry auction.   
The literature offers various possible reasons for the dominance of open 
outcry over the study period. Sarkar and Tozzi [14] for example, suggest 
floor traders could have executed large or complex trades more easily than 
e-traders, e.g. “stop loss orders” or various types of “spread trades5”. More- 
over, Pirrong [10] suggests floor traders could have had better information 
as to the direction of the market given their observations of incoming order 
flow and eye-to-eye awareness of extant buying and selling positions. 
                                                          
4  Lati [9] reports that futures exchanges received 95.4% of their trades through electronic 
routing systems in the year 2000; the preferred media by which customers communicate with 
e-trading systems.  
5  These orders were more difficult to enter electronically on early e-trading platforms and 
typically required more “handling”. For example, executing “stop loss” orders entails buying 
or selling a contract when it reaches a specified price, while executing “spread” trades in- 
volves simultaneously buying and selling of two different futures contracts. 
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Conversely, e-orders are generally entered anonymously, with no one trader 
knowing who is entering a bid or an offer. In this sense e-trading on Project 
A may have generated less information regarding the “feel” of the market or 
the motiva- tions of potential counterparties. In addition, Pirrong [10] 
observes that e-traders must explicitly withdraw old quotes from their 
screens, which is rela- tively time consuming and increases exposure to 
adverse selection risk. Such market frictions are consistent with the 
perception that highly active con- tracts, such as CBOT’s 30-year T-bond 
futures, may have been traded more efficiently in open outcry auctions 
(Kharouf [7]).   
While the above arguments would explain the relative popularity of 
open outcry over the 1998-1999 study period, they do not explain why e-
trading was the dominant means of exchange in Europe (at France’s Matif, 
Ger- many’s DTB and the UK’s LIFFE), or why the CBOT would continue 
deve- loping its e-trading platforms despite their apparent drawbacks. 
Perhaps these questions are better answered by considering the actions taken 
by CBOT to increase the distribution of its e-traded products; specifically, 
its decision to replace Project A (August 2000) with the a/c/e-alliance 
platform (alliance/cbot/eurex), giving CBOT direct entry into Europe. The 
a/c/e plat- form set up a common network for e-trading of derivatives 
between CBOT and EUREX, then the world’s leading e-futures market. The 
“implicit mer- ger” between organizations supported the growth of e-traded 
products at the CBOT. 6   Indeed, by 2003, the a/c/e-alliance platform 
accounted for over 70% of all U.S. Bond futures trading, a far cry from the 
Project A experience (see Figure 1). 
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6 The term “implicit merger” was first introduced by Domowitz [3]. The present use of the term 
signifies an economic organization with infrastructure capacity to market a larger array of 
products or handle a larger volume of trade at lower cost.  
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Figure 1 T-Bond E-Trading as % of Total Trading 
The a/c/e platform was scheduled to operate through 2008. However, in 
early 2002, the market structure of Europe’s futures industry shifted with the 
reorganization of LIFFE and its takeover by Euronext (creating Euronext 
liffe) 7 . These developments enabled LIFFE to begin marketing its 
proprietary e-trading technologies. Soon after, CBOT ended its alliance with 
EUREX (effective January 2004) and opened e-cbot® under a licensing 
agreement with Euronext.liffe8. The new trade network gives CBOT a direct 
market for its products at 556 locations in 26 countries worldwide, creating 
the world’s most widely accessible e-trading platform.   
Fundamentally, the development of e-trading platforms at the CBOT is 
mindful of Schumpeter’s concept of Creative Destruction: the process by 
which technological innovation and organizational change combine in rede- 
fining the boundaries of competition9. Of present interest is the assimilation 
and performance of e-trading vis-à-vis the operation of side-by-side markets.  
To this end, the remainder of this paper studies the price-volume behavior 
between Project A and the open outcry auction. The notion that trade 
volume conditions price discovery is a feature of the study. Deep markets, 
such as CBOT’s open outcry auction of T-bonds, tend to have relatively low 
price volatility in the sense that prices move little in response to increased 
trade volume. On the contrary, thin markets such as Project A tend to have 
greater price volatility. Anticipating results the study finds price volatility 
tends to decrease symmetrically in both markets due to increased volumes of 
open outcry trading, thus underscoring the value of contemporaneous 
trading in the early development of CBOT’s e-trading system.     
  
                                                          
7  Euronext.liffe formed in 2001 following the purchase of LIFFE by Euronext, a consortium of 
various European derivatives markets, including: Amsterdam, Brussels, LIFFE, Lisbon, and 
Paris. To motivate its purchase, LIFFE adopted a for-profit ownership structure and separated 
its technology business from its trading business; steps which created market value. 
8 The newest platform is powered by LIFFE CONNECT® software and Sun Microsystems 
infrastructure. Among its notable features, LIFFE CONNECT® software provides for the 
calculation of “implied pricing,”  “best-price quotations” and “dynamic pricing limits” which 
move automatically with the market thus reducing the potential for mis-trades. 
9  Creative Destruction signifies a process which, “incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.   . . . 
(With) every piece of business strategy acquir(ing) its true significance only against the 
background of that process and within the situation created by it….(With) competition 
(created) from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new 
type of organization…” From Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 
1975) [orig. pub. 1942], pp. 82-85 
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3. Study Data    
Study data for CBOT futures contracts on 30-year US treasury bonds is 
provided by the CBOT Market Information Department for the period Octo- 
ber 1, 1998 thru August 5, 1999. The data cover 211 trading days and 
include separate trade volume and price information for the Project A and 
open outcry daytime sessions (7:20 am to 2:00 pm Chicago time). The 
CBOT identifies contracts traded through open outcry by the ticker symbol 
US, and those traded on Project A by the ticker symbol ZB. Accordingly, 
the study denotes open outcry trade volume and average daily price as 
USVOL and USP, and Project A trade volume and average daily price as 
ZBVOL and ZBP. Table 1 reports their sample statistics.   
The average daily price levels in open outcry (USP) and Project A (ZBP) 
have similar means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation (CV). 
On the contrary, both the means and standard deviations of the trading 
volumes vary significantly between sessions. Project A volume (ZBVOL) 
averages approximately 2 percent of open outcry volume (USVOL) and ex- 
hibits significantly more dispersion about the mean (CV = 0.73 compared to 
CV = 0.38).  Figure 2 plots the price-volume time series.   
Both price series trend downward over the study period, akin to random 
walk models with stochastic drift. Consequently, each series {USP} and 
{ZBP} appears to be a non-stationary stochastic process (or unit root pro- 
cess)10. Confirmation of the random walk price behavior is given by Dickey-
Fuller (D-F) tests for unit roots. Here the D-F τ-statistics of  
Table 1 Sample Statistics 
n = 211 trading days Mean Max Min S.D. CV D-F τ* 
Open outcry price level 
USP 122,766 134,188 113,781 5,266 0.0429 -1.32 
Project A price level 
ZBP 122,779 134,125 113,813 5,264 0.0429 -1.29 
Open outcry  volume  
USVOL 338,730 760,417 85,571 130,126 0.3842  
Project A volume  
ZBVOL 6,426 33,897 0 4,702 0.7317  
* The Mackinnon critical values for rejection of unit roots are 3.4634. Accordingly, the τ-statis- 
tics indicate the price series have unit roots (i.e. they are non-stationary stochastic processes). 
                                                          
10 Formally, a stochastic process {Xt} which follows a random walk is referred to in the time 
series literature as a non-stationary stochastic process (or unit root process), i.e. its mean 
and/or variance change over time. 
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Figure 2 Price-Volume Data for 30-Year T-Bond Futures Traded 
Electronically (ZBP-ZBVOL) and through  
Open Outcry (USP-USVOL). 
 
-1.32 and -1.29 do not exceed the Mackinnon critical value of 3.4634, 
suggesting that both series are unit root processes and thus non-stationary. 
This is an important feature insofar as modeling the interrelationship 
between market prices. 
4. VEC Framework  
The absence of arbitrage between the Project A and open outcry 
markets implies the price series USP and ZBP cannot drift apart in a 
persistent man- ner11. Thus, while each series is individually non-stationary, 
                                                          
11 Suppose not, and that T-bond futures are trading at 120-20 through open outcry and 120-31 
on Project A. In the absence of transaction costs, an arbitrageur could simultaneously buy 100 
contracts in the pit and sell them on Project A for a risk-free profit of  F(Pe - Pp) = 100[ 120-
31 - 120-20]. Clearly, the incentives for increased selling on Project A and buying in the open 
outcry auction would result in the absence of arbitrage opportunities across the side-by-side 
platform. 
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the two series are certain to be cointegrated in the sense of Engel-Granger 
[5]; that is, a stationary linear combination of the two price series may exist 
as defined by the cointegrating regression USPt-1 = β ZBPt-1 + ηt, where ηt is 
a stationary stochastic process with zero-mean and finite variance. In 
economic terms, this cointegrating regression establishes an “equilibrium-
type relationship” between prices on Project A and the open outcry auction. 
On average the two markets will tend to be in equilibrium as defined by the 
mathematical expec- tation E[ηt] = 0. On the contrary, deviations from 
equilibrium (or “equili- brium errors”) are implied by ηt ≠ 0. For modeling 
purposes, such deviations are assumed to be corrected by adjustments in one 
or both price series based on the following error correction mechanism:  
                        
)2()()(
)1()()(
111
111
ustuszbttzbt
ustususttust
ZBPUSPZBP
ZBPUSPUSP
μηγμβγ
μηγμβγ
+=+−=Δ
+=+−=Δ
−−−
−−−
where γus and γzb are price-response parameters and µus and µzb are random 
shocks specific to each market.  
Convergence towards price equilibrium requires that at least one of the 
price-response parameters be significantly different from zero. For example, 
if  γus<γzb ≤ 0 then deviations from equilibrium (i.e. “equilibrium errors” 
where ηt-1 ≠ 0) will be followed primarily by equilibrating price changes in 
the open outcry auction. In this case, open outcry prices are said to be rela- 
tively more price-responsive compared to Project A prices. On the contrary, 
if γzb<γus≤ 0 then equilibrium price adjustments will occur primarily on Pro- 
ject A. Given this error-correction process, a vector error correction (VEC) 
model is specified by extending equations (1a) and (1b) to include lagged 
changes in  average daily price levels (ΔUSPt-k and ΔZBPt-k ), and daily 
trade volumes (USVOL and ZBVOL), yielding the following reduced-form 
VEC model: 
)4()()()(
)3()()()(
,2,212
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where ηt-1 = USPt-1 -β ZBPt-1  represent deviations from the cointegrating 
equilibrium, and  Φus and Φzb are volume parameters capturing the effects of 
market depth on price behavior, i.e. price-volume causality across the 
trading platform. Accordingly, the VEC allows testing competing 
hypotheses of price-volume effects on the market microstructure. 
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Symmetrical price responsiveness to changes in open outcry volume is 
implied by Φus having the same sign in both reduced form equations. For 
example, negative (positive) signs are indicative that increased open outcry 
volume dampens (increases) price volatility in both markets. On the contrary, 
an asymmetrical price response pattern to changes in floor volume is implied 
by Φus having mixed signs in both reduced form equations. Similar inter- 
pretations apply in examining price responsiveness relative to changes in e-
traded volume.  
Because each regression equation has the same number of lagged endo- 
genous variables, ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation of each equation 
separately yields efficient parameter estimates. Ultimately, each equation 
was estimated using k = 4 lags in each of the endogenous prices series 
(ΔUSP and ΔZBP), covering daily trade activity over a one-week period12. 
OLS estima- tion of the reduced-form VAR using four lags on each 
endogenous variable yields 12 parameter estimates per equation. These 
parameters include a con- stant term (c1 or c2 ); an error-correction term 
describing the responsiveness of price levels to deviations from their 
cointegrating equilibrium (γus or γzb ); eight parameters describing the 
intertemporal significance of lagged changes in the price levels, i.e. the 
autoregressive components (a1,k , b1,k  or a2,k, b2,k ); and the two volume terms 
(Φus and Φzb )13. Table 2 reports the parameter estimates.   
Price adjustment towards equilibrium requires at least one of the price-
response parameters be statistically different from zero. Here, the relatively 
large (absolute) value |γus | = |-2.3905| points to the responsiveness of open 
outcry prices to the previous day’s deviation from long-run equilibrium. On 
the other hand, the smaller (absolute) value |γzb | = |-0.6366| implies Project 
A prices are relatively unresponsive to the previous day’s equilibrium error.  
Consequently the signs and values of the price-response parameters suggest 
open outcry tends to drive long-run price equilibrium across markets. This 
asymmetric price adjustment process is a fundamental feature of the price-
setting mechanism over the study period, consistent with leadership role of 
                                                          
12 The Aikaiki information criteria (AIC) supports a model with 4 lags in each of the price series 
(AIC = 21.38). Longer lag lengths of k = 16, 12, 8 did not significantly reduce the sum of 
squared residuals, while unnecessarily increasing losses in degrees of freedom. See Enders [4] 
pg. 88 for further discussion of this and other model selection criteria.   
13 Of course, the OLS regression results also provide estimates of the reduced form-residuals 
and elements in the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
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open outcry auctions in the early phase of side-by-side trading. Procedures 
for testing Granger causality are discussed next14. 
Table 2 VEC Parameter Estimates 
Variable             Lag USP equation (R2 = 0.23) ZBP equation (R
2 
=0.31) 
 (i=) Coeff. t-val. Coeff. t-val. 
USPt-I 1 2.7877 2.6913 2.1808 2.2287 
 2 1.7684 2.0004 1.3153 1.5749 
 3 0.7766 1.1261 0.4123 0.6328 
 4 0.4357 0.9817 0.1719 0.4101 
ZBPt-I 1 -2.4868 -2.3973 -1.8749 -1.9134 
 2 -1.8419 -2.0917 -1.3866 -1.6668 
 3 -0.7989 -1.1758 -0.4201 -0.6544 
 4 -0.6405 -1.5196 -0.3900 -0.9798 
Error Correction 
Terms 
(price-response 
coeff.) 
γ us and γ zb 
 -2.3905 -2.0468 -0.6366 -0.5771 
Open Outcry 
Volume Φ us  -0.0005       -2.345 -0.0004             -2.2050 
Project A Volume 
Φzb  0.0006        0.0763 0.0032               0.4055 
    
VEC Pairwise Granger Causality Tests – Null 
Ho: P-value 
ΔUSPt-i  does not Granger Cause ZBPt 
ΔZBPt-i  does not Granger Cause USPt 
0.0782 
0.1064 
                                                          
14 The discussion which follows is based on techniques outlined in Enders [4] pgs. 367 and 371.  
The reader is referred to this reference for further discussion of Granger causality test 
procedures in the context of VEC time-series models. 
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Following Enders [5] a formal analysis of Granger causality involving 
the cointegrated price series requires a combination of t-tests on the esti- 
mated price-response parameters and block exogeneity tests (Wald tests) on 
the joint significance of each of the lagged first-differenced price variables.  
Specifically, lagged price changes on Project A (ΔZBPt-k) are said to Gran- 
ger-cause Open outcry prices (USPt ) if the price-response parameter (γus ) 
and the lagged price-change parameters (b1,k ) are significantly different 
from zero in the open outcry equation. Note that while the price-response 
parame- ter is statistically significant (t = -2.0468) the Wald statistic shows 
the b1,k parameters are not significantly different from zero (p-value 0.1064). 
Conse- quently lagged price changes on Project A do not Granger cause 
open outcry price levels.   
Meanwhile, our results give no evidence of  lagged Open Outcry  price 
changes (ΔUSPt-k ) Granger-causing Project A price levels (ZBPt). Referring 
to the project A equation, the price-response parameter (γzb) is statistically 
insignificant (t = -0.5771), and the lagged price-change parameters (a2,k) are 
not significantly different from zero ( p-value = 0.0782). Overall, no evid- 
ence is found that lagged price changes Granger caused price behavior in 
either market, i.e. there is no “news” in yesterday’s price changes.  
 Finally, the signs of the volume parameters have economic importance 
in identifying the effects of volume on price volatility and market-making 
capacity. First, an independent-markets hypothesis is consistent with the 
observation that trade volume in one market is statistically insignificant (un- 
informative) in explaining contemporaneous price behavior in the other 
market. Accordingly, the identification of independent-markets implies Φzb 
= 0 in the open outcry price equation while Φus = 0 in the Project A price 
equation. Conversely, evidence of an interdependent market structure requi- 
res at least one of these parameters be statistically significant in both 
reduced form equations. The specific case where Φus is significant in both 
equations and Φzb is not, describes the case of symmetric price-
responsiveness to changes in open outcry volume. Of course, a third 
possibility is that market depth provides no significant information in 
explaining price behavior, in which case the volume parameters would 
appear statistically insignificant in both reduced form equations.  
These alternative hypotheses were examined with conventional t-tests 
on the estimated volume parameters. The parameter estimates for Project A 
vo- lume are insignificant in explaining price behavior in either of the 
reduced form equations, implying that Project A volume is inconsequential 
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in ex- plaining long-term market price adjustments (Φzb = 0.0006, t = 0.0763 
and Φzb = 0.0032, t = 0.4055). On the contrary, the parameter estimates for 
open outcry volume are negative and statistically significant in both 
equations (Φus = -0.0005, t = -2.345 and  Φus =  -0.0004, t = -2.2050). Thus, 
price volatility tends to decrease symmetrically in both markets due to 
increasing volumes of open outcry trading. These results strengthen the 
market leadership role of open outcry auctions in determining price 
equilibria on the side-by-side trading platform over the first year of 
operations.   
5. Concluding Remarks  
This study of CBOT’s Project A and open outcry markets casts doubt on 
the belief that e-trading systems are invariably superior to open outcry mar- 
kets, particularly in the early phase of contemporaneous trading wherein the 
majority of trades continue to stop at the desk for hand delivery to the pit.  
The case study of CBOT interest rate futures allows examining daily price-
volume data for contracts which were simultaneously traded at a common 
futures exchange during the early phase of side-by-side trading. The study 
assumes the dynamics of this data are well described by a simple time series 
model in which cointegrated pricing and market depth contribute to price 
discovery. Two inferences may be drawn from these measurement proced- 
ures.   
First, there is clear evidence of an interdependent market structure bet- 
ween open outcry and screen-based trading with open outcry singularly res- 
ponsible for maintaining price equilibrium. Second, both price responsive- 
ness and market depth are fundamental in explaining the relative importance 
of open outcry trading in reducing price volatility and restoring the price 
equilibrium relationships. Both of these arguments suggest open outcry auc- 
tions performed a price leadership role during the early phase of side-by-
side trading at the CBOT.   
The findings in this study build on previous research by identifying the 
joint importance of price responsiveness and market depth in explaining the 
lead-role of open outcry sessions in the price discovery process. Unlike 
Shyy and Lee [11], who find one-way causality from electronic to open 
outcry markets, our results are suggestive that screen-based and open outcry 
mar- kets may initially be interdependent in maintaining equilibrium price 
rela- tionships. Also, in contrast to the bi-directional causality found by 
Kofman and Moser [7], we find that open outcry takes a leadership role by 
deepening the overall market and restoring long-run price equilibrium across 
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trading sy- stems. Furthermore, Pirrong [8] finds an asymmetrical impact of 
volume on price volatility which suggests a scarcity of market-making 
capacity in the open outcry market (LIFFE) compared to the screen-based 
market (DTB).  Conversely, the present study finds open outcry volume 
having a symme- trical dampening effect on price volatility across markets, 
implying the ab- sence of any resource constraints on market-making 
capacity. 
These interpretations are subject to at least two major qualifications.  
First, any interpretation of price behavior across screen-based and open out- 
cry markets is conditional on the time period of analysis and information 
variables included in the analysis. In this study, we examine the early phase 
of side-by-side trading with price and volume measured on a day-by-day 
basis. This research design gives an alternative representation of market dy- 
namics relative to the ones examined in the various LIFFE-DTB studies.  
Second, the present study maintains trade volume is exogenous with respect 
to the residual terms in the reduced form model. While this assumption 
avoids the simultaneity issues posed by a more complex model specification, 
it may oversimplify the relationship between the error correction process 
and the contemporaneous price-volume relationships between markets. 
Finally, it is hoped that this study makes a contribution in the area of e-
trading and e-business generally.   
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